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ANTITRUST LAW
May a Foreign Plaintiff Sue a Foreign Defendant
for Conduct Outside the U.S. That Caused
Antitrust Injury Outside the U.S.?
by Antonio F. Perez
PREVIEW of Uniwd States Supreme Court Cases, pages 380-385. © 2004 American Bar Association.
ISSUES
May the respondents, five foreign
companies that purchased goods
outside the United States from other
foreign companies, pursue Sherman
Act claims seeking recovery for
overcharges paid in transactions
occurring entirely outside U.S. com-
merce under the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a?
Do such foreign plaintiffs lack stand-
ing under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)?
FACTS
The respondents are five foreign
companies located in Australia,
Ecuador, Panama, and Ukraine. On
behalf of foreign and domestic pur-
chasers of vitamins, they brought a
class action in July 2000 against the
petitioners, a number of multina-
tional companies, for allegedly con-
spiring to fix prices and allocate
markets for vitamins on a global
basis between January 1, 1988 and
February 1999 in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1. The respondents sought
treble damages and injunctive relief
under Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and
26, including damages for injuries
they allege were suffered by foreign
persons because of purchases made
outside the United States. The
respondents also asserted claims
arising under foreign and interna-
tional law. This matter arose in light
of a complex history of federal civil
and criminal enforcement proceed-
ings, as well as foreign and domestic
private civil claims.
Initially, the vitamin companies
moved to dismiss the suit as to the
foreign plaintiffs under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12 (b)(1), for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the FTAIA and
for lack of standing under the
Clayton Act. Because the district
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court dismissed the foreign pur-
chasers' claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, it did not reach
the issue of standing. The district
court also declined to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over respon-
dents' foreign law claims, and, find-
ing no international law norm pro-
hibiting private conspiracies to fix
prices and allocate markets, it dis-
missed their claims under custom-
ary international law for failure to
state a claim. See Empagran S.A. v.
F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2001 WL
761360, at 5-9 (D.C.C. June 7,
2001).
On the subject-matter jurisdiction
issue, the court of appeals reviewed
the district court's interpretation of
the FTAIA provisions that prohibit
Sherman Act jurisdiction with
respect to "conduct involving for-
eign trade or commerce" unless two
requirements are met. Under FTAIA
Section 1, the conduct must have "a
direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on U.S. com-
merce, and, under Section 2, such
effect must "give rise to a claim
under" the Sherman Act. The court
found that the "a claim" language of
the second requirement did not
refer exclusively to the claim
brought by the plaintiff with respect
to the conduct at issue. Rather, the
court of appeals read the FTAIA as
also applying to extraterritorial con-
duct that gives rise to separate
claims by U.S. purchasers and for-
eign purchasers. If, then, a U.S. per-
son had "a claim" within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act, then the
FTAIA would not deny a U.S. court
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim
by a foreign person arising from the
foreign effects of the conduct that
gave rise to a separate claim in the
United States. The court of appeals
held that, because the foreign plain-
tiffs had, in fact, asserted the exis-
tence of such U.S. claims, their
claim satisfied the conditions set
forth in the FTAIA for the exercise
ES SUPKRk
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
U.S. courts over Sherman Act
claims. See Empagran S.A., et al. v.
F Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. et al., 315
F.3d 338, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3374.
In reaching this conclusion, the
court of appeals found the language
of the FTAIA insufficiently clear to
support a plain-meaning interpreta-
tion. Specifically, it rejected the
respondents' argument that inter-
preting the "gives rise to a claim"
language as referring only to claims
arising from effects in the United
States would render superfluous the
language in Section 6 of the FTAIA
(which provides that, if the
Sherman Act applies only because
the conduct affects "export trade or
export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United
States," then it applies "to such
conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States"). In
other words, the respondents argued
that interpreting the "gives rise to a
claim" language to refer only to
claims for injury arising from effects
in the United States would make
unnecessary the final proviso's limi-
tation of damages for injury to U.S.
exports, because claims relating to
U.S. exports would already be
excluded by Section 2 if petitioners'
interpretation were correct. The
court of appeals was not persuaded,
because it determined that Section
6 might also serve to preclude
Sherman Act jurisdiction for dam-
ages with respect to operations out-
side the United States that would
not themselves constitute "export"
activities. On this basis, it rejected
the suggestion that petitioners' nar-
row interpretation of Section 2
would make Section 6 surplusage.
Thus, the court of appeals refused
to accept respondents' argument
that the plain meaning of Section 2
rules out petitioners' interpretation.
The court of appeals did, however,
find other grounds to adopt respon-
dents' proposed interpretation. It
relied on legislative history, particu-
larly the underlying policies of
deterrence embedded in the FTAIA.
The court of appeals cited Supreme
Court precedent to describe
Congress's purpose in enacting the
FTAIA as "to exempt from the
Sherman Act export transactions
that did not injure the U.S. econo-
my." See Empagran, 315 F.3d at
345 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796-97
(1993)). But it relied on specific
passages in the House Report to the
FTAIA to find that Congress's intent
was to address the question of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by pro-
hibiting jurisdiction over "conduct"
lacking the requisite U.S. effects
rather than by specifying the rela-
tionship between the claims that
could be adjudicated and that con-
duct. Congress then denied jurisdic-
tion only over "wholly foreign trans-
actions" not having any "spillover
effects" in the United States. Id. at
353-54. The court of appeals also
relied on the Supreme Court's pre-
FTAIA decision in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U.S. 308
(1978), cited approvingly in the
FTAIA's legislative history, as further
evidence for its interpretation. See
Empagran, at 315 F.3d at 354 (cit-
ing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686). In Pfizer,
the Supreme Court determined that
a foreign government had standing
under the Clayton Act to assert a
Sherman Act claim in order to
ensure that foreign antitrust viola-
tors would perceive the full costs of
their antitrust violations, thereby
deterring more effectively global
conspiracies that might harm U.S.
consumers. The court of appeals
concluded that this deterrence
rationale would be served by its
interpretation of the FTAIA. See
Empagran, 315 F.3d at 355-57.
(Continued on Page 382)
American Bar Association
With respect to the standing issue,
the court of appeals read the
Clayton Act to be coterminous with
the FTAIA. It described the foreign
purchasers' injury as the type of
injury contemplated by the antitrust
laws, thereby satisfying the special
''antitrust injury" requirement set
forth by the Supreme Court. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 489 (1977).
The court of appeals rejected
respondents' argument that,
because the antitrust laws do not
forbid the fixing of prices in foreign
markets, injury to foreign pur-
chasers was not of "the type" the
antitrust laws were designed to pre-
vent. Indeed, the court said: "[T]he
arguments that have already per-
suaded us that, where anticompeti-
tive conduct harms domestic com-
merce, [the] FTAIA allows foreign
plaintiffs injured by anticompetitive
conduct to sue to enforce the
antitrust laws similarly persuade us
that the antitrust laws intended to
prevent the harm that the foreign
plaintiffs suffered here." See
Empagran, 315 F.3d at 358. In
short, the court of appeals grounded
its standing analysis on its interpre-
tation of the FTAIA.
In sum, the court of appeals deter-
mined that respondents' FTAIA
claims should survive a motion to
dismiss; it then reversed the district
court's decision on subject matter
jurisdiction and vacated its judg-
ment against respondents. Because
of the new posture of the case, it
also required the district court to
reconsider whether to invoke its
discretion to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction to hear the respondents'
foreign-law claims. See Empagran,
315 F.3d at 359.
On petition for rehearing en banc,
the court of appeals invited the
solicitor general to submit a brief
expressing the views of the United
States. In its submission on behalf
of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission, the solicitor
general urged en banc review to
reverse the D.C. Circuit panel's
reading of the FTAIA. The solicitor
general suggested that the court of
appeals's interpretation both accord-
ed with the plain meaning of the
statute and conflicted with federal
antitrust enforcement policy by
undermining the government's cor-
porate leniency policy (which facili-
tates the acquisition of evidence in
conspiracy cases in return for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
The D.C. Circuit denied rehearing,
and petitioners sought a writ of
certiorari.
In granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court now has an opportunity to
resolve a recently emerged split in
the circuits in the interpretation of
the FTAIA. The central question is
the meaning of the requirement that
conduct having a "direct, substan-
tial, and foreseeable effect" on U.S.
commerce also gives rise to "a
claim" under the Sherman Act. The
Fifth Circuit has held that the
"effect" in the U.S. must itself give
rise to the very Sherman Act claim
brought by the plaintiff. See Den
Norske Stats Qijeselskap AS v.
HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420 (5th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom.
Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 534
U.S. 1127 (2002). The Second
Circuit has held that, although the
foreign conduct must give rise to an
effect in the United States, this
effect need not give rise to any
Sherman Act claim in the United
States in order for a foreign plaintiff
to sue a foreign defendant for a
Sherman Act claim arising outside
the United States. See Kruman v.
Christie's International PLC v.o.f.
284 F.3d 384 (2nd Cir. 2002). The
D.C. Circuit, apparently splitting the
difference, has now held that in
order for a foreign plaintiff to assert
a Sherman Act claim with respect to
extraterritorial conduct's foreign
effects, the extraterritorial conduct
must have an effect in the United
States that gives rise to a separate
claim under the Sherman Act claim
for antitrust injury in the United
States. See Empagran S.A., et al. v.
F Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. et al., Id.
Having denied certiorari to consider
the Fifth Circuit's narrow interpre-
tation of the FTAIA in HeereMac,
the Supreme Court has now granted
certiorari to review the D.C.
Circuit's broader interpretation in
Empagran as well as, presumably,
the Second Circuit's still broader
interpretation in Kruman.
CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioners now argue that the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation conflicts with
the plain language of the FTAIA,
undermines federal enforcement
policy in international antitrust cas-
es, and arguably takes the statute
beyond Congress's authority to regu-
late foreign commerce. First, they
argue that the "most natural" read-
ing of the FTAIA, which they note is
endorsed by the Department of
Justice, is that the requisite anti-
competitive effect described by
Section 1 itself gives rise to the
claim described by Section 2, which
in turn must be the claim brought
by the plaintiff before the court. Pet.
Br. at 7. Thus, petitioners argue that
the court of appeals found statutory
ambiguity where there was none.
Petitioners note that the enactment
of the FTAIA in 1982 reflected a
congressional effort to pare back the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdic-
tion by U.S. courts in antitrust cas-
es, after a generation of antitrust
jurisdictional conflicts leading to
foreign retaliatory measures. They
note that, as of the time the FTAIA
was enacted, "no case had ever
authorized claims arising from for-
eign transactions occurring wholly
outside U.S. commerce, and virtual-
ly all academic commentary urged
that the focus of U.S. antitrust law
Issue No. 7
be restricted to claims arising from
effect of anticompetitive conduct on
U.S. commerce." Pet. Br. at 9-10.
Second, as to the broad deterrence
rationale underlying the court of
appeals's interpretation, petitioners
allude to the solicitor general's argu-
ment that the court of appeals's
interpretation of the FTAIA, by
undermining the government's cor-
porate leniency program, would
actually reduce deterrence. Pet. Br.
at 10. This argument was also made
by the solicitor general's amicus
brief submitted to the D.C. Circuit
in support of a rehearing en banc
and reiterated in his amicus brief
submitted to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners' statement of facts
observes that "more than seventy-
five federal civil antitrust cases,
including class actions, were filed
beginning in 1998 and consolidated
in pretrial proceeding in the district
court. Virtually all the claims in
those cases have now settled for
amounts exceeding $2 billion." Pet.
Br. at 4. They add: "Beginning in
1999, before any significant pro-
ceeding in the civil cases, several
petitioners pleaded guilty to federal
criminal antitrust violations for fix-
ing prices of vitamins sold in the
United States ... Outside the United
States, record civil penalties exceed-
ing $1 billion were assessed against
some petitioners by the European
Union, Canada, Australia, and
Korea. Private civil suits for dam-
ages have also been filed in Canada,
the United Kingdom, Germany,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, and
class actions have been filed in
Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand." Id. (citations omitted).
Third, petitioners maintain that the
court of appeals's reading of the
FTAIA "might well" extend it
beyond the scope of Congress's pow-
er to regulate commerce "with for-
eign Nations, and among the several
States." See U.S. Const., Art. 1, sec.
8, cl. 3. They maintain that under
the Foreign Commerce Clause,
Congress lacks the constitutional
power to create a private claim for
purely foreign purchasers against
purely foreign sellers for transac-
tions consummated entirely within
or between foreign countries when
those transactions have no effect on
U.S. commerce or U.S. foreign com-
merce. They also argue that, in view
of established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence prevent-
ing the application of state law to
persons and transactions unrelated
to that state, the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause should bar a
federal court from applying federal
law to transactions and persons that
are unrelated to the United States.
Petitioners therefore urge an inter-
pretation of the FTAIA that avoids
these constitutional doubts. Pet. Br.
at 29-30.
Respondents ask the Supreme Court
to sustain the court of appeals's
interpretation of the FTAIA but also
argue in the alternative that their
claim should go forward even under
the narrower interpretation of the
statute advanced by petitioners.
Respondents advance three main
arguments in response to petition-
ers' contentions. First, they argue
that, even if petitioners are correct
that Section 2 of the FTAIA requires
that an effect in the United States
"give rise to a claim" (that is to say,
gives rise to "the" claim brought by
respondents), that requirement
would be satisfied in this case. They
assert that it was because petition-
ers prevented respondents from
buying vitamins in the United States
directly or through intermediaries
that respondents were forced to
make those purchases outside the
United States and suffered antitrust
injuries there from the global vita-
min cartel. Moreover, the effective-
ness of the cartel in the United
States is what made its success
overseas possible; otherwise, "the
cartel would have collapsed every-
where as a result of arbitrage." Pet.
Br. at 3. If accepted by the Supreme
Court, these characterizations of
the underlying economic facts of
the case would dispose of petition-
ers' Foreign Commerce Clause and
Fifth Amendment Due Process argu-
ments, at least as applied to the par-
ticular facts of this case. They
would, at a minimum, warrant a
remand, which might allow respon-
dents another opportunity at the
district court to establish the juris-
dictional facts necessary to survive
a motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
Second, respondents also argue
that, because the FTAIA applies
only to export commerce, it simply
does not apply to "cartels, which
directly involve U.S. domestic and
import commerce." Third, they
argue that this interpretation is
plainly supported by legislative his-
tory, which they maintain reveals
that Congress intended Section 2
"merely to provide that the
Sherman Act does not apply to con-
duct that has a pro-competitive
effect" in the United States.
Respondents add that the Clayton
Act's standing and injury require-
ments do not immunize unlawful
activity, such as the global cartel
that harmed U.S. commerce as well
as foreign purchasers in this case.
Moreover, they describe the special
antitrust standing and injury
requirements as merely "prudential
doctrines" and characterize respon-
dents themselves as precisely the
kind of "direct purchasers" whose
claims would deter conduct directly
harming U.S. consumers. Id. at 4.
In addition, respondents address
arguments advanced principally by
the amicus curiae in this case. The
respondents contend that the
United States's argument that the
(Continued on Page 384)
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U.S. corporate leniency policy
would be undermined by granting
jurisdiction in this case is unsus-
tainable in the face of pending legis-
lation that would limit the civil lia-
bility of leniency program partici-
pants. Respondents argue that the
fact that the Congress is now con-
sidering such legislation suggests
that the more appropriate inference
is that no limits on civil liability
currently flow from the exercise of
federal prosecutorial discretion in
international cartel cases.
Respondents also dismiss the argu-
ment advanced by the governments
of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
the Netherlands as amici curiae
that the court of appeals's interpre-
tation of the FTAIA flies in the face
of international law. These govern-
ments, as well as petitioners, quote
Lord Denning's memorable phrase:
"As a moth is drawn to the light, so
is a litigant drawn to the United
States. If he can only get his case
into their courts, he stands to win a
fortune." Smith Kline & French
Labs Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R.
730 (C.A. 1982). Amici Curiae Br.
at 14, and Pet. Br. at 26. These for-
eign governments suggest, therefore,
that the interpretation of the FTAIA
adopted by the court of appeals
would encourage forum shopping,
undermine their own antitrust
enforcement policies (as well as that
of the European Union), and under-
mine respect for national sovereign-
ty in violation of international law.
Accordingly, the governments main-
tain that the court of appeals's inter-
pretation would be inconsistent
with the established canon of statu-
tory interpretation that, in the
absence of express congressional
intent to the contrary, statutes
should not be interpreted to violate
the law of nations. Amici Curiae Br.
at 7 (citing John Marshall's famous
dictum in Murray v. The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)).
Respondents reply that this argu-
ment is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's view in Hartford
Fire Ins., its most recent statement
on conflicts of jurisdiction in
antitrust, that the "mere overlap" of
antitrust enforcement regimes is
insufficient to establish that an
exercise of jurisdiction is in viola-
tion of international law.
Respondents add that there could
be no conflict in this case since
"cartels are universally con-
demned." That said, respondents
nevertheless acknowledge a conflict
in the sense that the "application of
the Sherman Act remains necessary
overseas because current enforce-
ment overseas is too lax to protect
U.S. interests" (italics in original).
But that, they say, is a matter for
Congress to resolve. Res. Br. at 5.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's treatment of
the narrow question of statutory
interpretation raised by this case
may well be significant in at least
two different ways. First, the
renewed attention to the meaning of
the FTAIA reflects the increasing
internationalization of antitrust
enforcement. The FTAIA, enacted in
1982 after several decades of U.S.
antitrust extraterritoriality far in
excess of what our major trading
partners deemed permissible,
reflects a more than two-decades-
old congressional policy judgment
as to the appropriate extent of
extraterritoriality in U.S. antitrust
enforcement.
Regardless of precisely how the
Supreme Court resolves the current
circuit split, its decision may well
prompt Congress to revisit the issue
of the appropriate extent of U.S.
extraterritorial exercise of antitrust
jurisdiction in an entirely different
context. Much has changed in a gen-
eration. Major U.S. firms such as
Microsoft now face the risk of for-
eign antitrust enforcement policies
conflicting with U.S. antitrust law
and policy. The executive branch
and Congress have expended con-
siderable resources in entering into
a series of bilateral cooperation
agreements with major U.S. trading
partners facilitating international
coordination in antitrust enforce-
ment. Looking to the future, sub-
stantive antitrust harmonization is
an issue on the agenda of the Doha
Round at the World Trade
Organization, although currently
executive branch policy appears to
be to block negotiations at that
forum.
The role of U.S. courts in this com-
plicated policy area has never been
murkier. Some might argue that an
aggressive assertion of extraterritor-
ial jurisdiction by U.S. courts would
provoke conflicts of jurisdiction,
which would lead to international
negotiations, which, in turn, would
yield political resolution in the form
of either agreed allocations of juris-
diction or substantive law harmo-
nization. Others might argue that
judicial restraint would better pro-
mote conciliation among the major
domestic antitrust enforcement
regimes that are competing for regu-
latory authority on the world stage.
Still others might argue that an
aggressive judicial assertion of juris-
diction would better ensure that
U.S., rather than foreign, antitrust
values prevail on the world stage as
the Sherman Act competes with
other nations' approaches to compe-
tition policy. The debate on these
issues may well be framed by the
Supreme Court's decision in this
case.
Second, the general question of
whether U.S. courts may serve as
fora for the vindication of the rights
of foreign plaintiffs' rights arises on
a number of other fronts as well. A
prominent example also before the
Supreme Court this term is the
Issue No. 7384
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a
two-century-old statute giving U.S.
courts jurisdiction to hear suits by
alien plaintiffs against alien defen-
dants for extraterritorial violations
of the law of nations. See Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 605 (9th
Cir. 2003)(en bane), cert. granted,
72 U.S.L.W. 3192; see also 6 PRE-
VIEW 363 (March 15, 2004). The
petitioners' Foreign Commerce
Clause and Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause arguments are clear-
ly significant in this context,
although the ATCA, unlike the
Sherman Act, provides a more
open-ended grant of jurisdiction to
U.S. courts to identify and define
international human rights-usual-
ly, but not necessarily, of a noneco-
nomic character. Both the FTAIA
(as read by the District of Columbia
and Second Circuits) and the ATCA
open the door for U.S. courts to vin-
dicate the rights of foreign plaintiffs
in suits against foreign defendants
on claims based on the extraterrito-
rial effects of extraterritorial con-
duct. In these cases, competing
viewpoints on two sets of issues that
regularly arise in the work of the
Supreme Court are implicated. The
first set concerns the relative impor-
tance of economic and noneconom-
ic individual rights. The second
involves the conflict between judi-
cial activism in the vindication of
natural rights and judicial restraint
in the assertion of authority to adju-
dicate arguably political questions
that have not clearly been delegated
to the courts by Congress. It will be
worth watching which combination
of viewpoints yields a majority in
these two related, albeit distinguish-
able, cases.
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